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UNIVERSALS AND PARTICULARS:
A COMMENT ON WOMEN'S HUMAN
RIGHTS AND RELIGIOUS
MARRIAGE CONTRACTS
CAROL WEBISBROD*
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article discusses definitions of marriage and divorce as we
find them in different cultural and legal contexts. The issue of defini-
tion is one that is important in relation to questions of women's
human rights, the efficacy of religious marriage contracts, and the gen-
eral issues of marriage and contract. This Article does not attempt to
resolve the question of definition as it might be resolved using any one
context. Thus, it does not attempt to answer the question: What does
'marriage' mean within the framework of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights? Rather it makes the point that different contexts pro-
vide different definitions of marriage.
The modem effort to achieve international recognition for human
rights has been, in part, an effort to move beyond a strictly political
conception of rights towards a view that is broader in two dimensions.
This view would not only include social and economic rights but
would also refer to rights within spheres of life traditionally viewed as
"private" and free of "intervention" from government at any time. As
a part of this, there have been attempts to move beyond formulations
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based on mutual cooperation or dignity and an emphasis on "equality
in marriage and divorce." The goal itself was stated in Article 16 of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: men and women are
entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dis-
solution.1 The outstanding example of gender equality as a norm for
human rights arguments is Article 16 of the 1979 convention forbid-
ding discrimination against women, providing that "States Parties
shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against
women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations and in
particular shall ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women" par-
ticularly with reference to "[t]he same right to enter into marriage";
"to choose a spouse and to enter into marriage only with their free
and full consent"; as well as "the same rights and responsibilities dur-
ing marriage and at its dissolution ...."I
This approach towards women is quite different from that taken
by some religious systems. Hilary Charlesworth explains: "[T]he
major religious traditions operate with asymmetric accounts of man-
hood and womanhood. This is rationalized, not as inequality as such,
but as based on a type of 'separate but equal' doctrine."3 Thus, while
women may have a spiritual and moral worth which is the equivalent
of that of men, "their life work is fundamentally different."' 4 When
these religious traditions are codified into religious legal systems
which are then enforced by state law, the issue becomes especially
visible and controversial. Theodore Meron argues:
[difficulties] both with regard to substantive law and to evidence
laws giving women's testimony less evidentiary weight (as in
Rabbinic and in Islamic courts), are particularly grave in countries
1. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states:
1. Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality, or
religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to
equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution.
2. Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the
intending spouses.
3. The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled
to protection by society and the State.
U.N. UNIVERSAL DECLARATION ON HUMAN Riarrrs, art. 16, para. 1 (1947). But see Egon
Schwelb, Marriage and Human Rights, 12 AM. J. Comp. L. 337, 376-77 n.150 (1963) (noting that
the laws of many Western industrial countries fell short of this).
2. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec.
18, 1979, art. 16, reprinted in CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN Ratrrs: A COMPILATION OF
INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 150, U.N. Doc. STiHR/1/Rev.5 (Vol. I/Part 1), U.N. Sales No.
E.94.XIV.1 (Vol. I/Part 1) (1994).
3. Hilary Charlesworth, The Challenges of Human Rights Laws for Religious Traditions, in
RELIGION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 401, 409 (Mark W. Janis & Carolyn Evans eds., 1999).
4. Id
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which do not follow strictly the principle of separation of Church
and State, and where tribunals which have jurisdiction over family
matters, marriage, divorce, custody, and so on, apply religious law
rather than the Convention.5
Egypt, for example, signed the convention with a reservation to Arti-
cle 16:
Reservation to the text of article 16 concerning the equality of men
and women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations
during the marriage and upon its dissolution, without prejudice to
the Islamic Sharia's provisions whereby women are accorded rights
equivalent to those of their spouses so as to ensure a just balance
between them. This is out of respect for the sacrosanct nature of the
firm religious beliefs which govern marital relations in Egypt and
which may not be called in question and in view of the fact that one
of the most important bases of these rights is an equivalency of
rights and duties so as to ensure complementarity which guarantees
true equality between spouses.6
One approach to this problem would give priority to women's
equality rights and in effect would view other rights (e.g., religious
free exercise rights) as "men's" rights. Another approach would privi-
lege religious positions in the name of religious liberty, as in the Egyp-
tian reservation. Yet another approach would ask very specific
questions about the religious doctrines adverse to women's rights,
using balancing tests to determine whether the doctrine is important
to the religion, and whether it is a major deterrent to women's rights.7
Yet Article 16 is not only about equality. Article 16 also opens
questions of choice or contract when it asks for free consent to "mar-
riage." In so doing, it opens the issues reviewed in this Article.
II. LOCATING THE UNIVERSALS OF MARRIAGE
AND DIVORCE
Where the question of religious human rights and ceremonies-
which is to say use of religious marriage contracts-seems once to
have related to one group having the same rights as another group,
the present issue is about individuals in a marital relation. The issue is
5. THEODOR MERON, HumAN RIGHTS LAW MAKING IN THE UNrrED NATIONS: A Cma-
TIQUE OF INSTRUMENTS AND PROCESS 79 (1986).
6. Id. at 78 (emphasis added) (citing Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-
General: Status as of 31 December 1984, at 153, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/3 (1985)).
7. See Donna J. Sullivan, Gender Equality and Religious Freedom: Towards a Framework
for Conflict Resolution, 24 INT'L L. & POL. 795, 821 (1992).
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not the legitimacy of the states' recognition of the form of the mar-
riage, or of the religion which uses that form, but the details of the
substantive content of the arrangement. According to Article 16,
women want equality in "marriage."
The word "marriage" may in fact require interpretation. What is
marriage? Does it include polygamy? Uncle-niece marriages? Same-
sex marriages? Child marriages?8 Temporary marriages?
Or will these be (as they used to say) understandings and institu-
tions of the sort that the law of England did not recognize as mar-
riage? Hyde v. Hyde9 made plain the context of its definition: "I
conceive that marriage, as understood in Christendom, may ... be
defined as the voluntary union for life of one man and one woman to
the exclusion of all others."1 And "marriage" as a term would have
to be placed in a context.
We know for example that in 1947, monogamy was advocated as
an international goal." But "marriage" has yet to be defined at all. It
does seem however that Reynolds v. United States'" and the rhetoric
of the nineteenth-century Mormon cases' 3 have cast a long shadow.
In 1946, an American Law Institute discussion of basic rights (later
submitted to the United Nations) indicated that proponents of
religious freedom did not condone polygamy.' 4  In 1976, Myres
8. P.M. Bromley comments:
Both by canon law and at common law a valid marriage could be contracted only if
both parties had reached the legal age of puberty, viz. 14 in the case of a boy and 12 in
the case of a girl. If either party were under this age when the marriage was contracted,
it could be avoided by either of them when that party reached the age of puberty; but if
the marriage was ratified (as it would impliedly be by continued cohabitation), it
became irrevocably binding. It is somewhat surprising that this remained the law until
well into the present century.
P. M. BROMLEY, FAMILY LAW 33 (3rd ed., 1966); see also FRED S. HALL & ELISABETH W.
BROOKE, MARRIAGE LAWS IN THEm SOCIAL ASPECTS 33 (1919) (indicating that in 1917 a fair
number of states did not regulate the ages of marriage, presumably leaving the common law ages
in place).
9. 1 L.R. 130 (P&D 1866).
10. Id. at 133.
11. In 1947, the first session of the U.N. Commission on the Status of Women referred to
"freedom of choice, dignity of the wife, monogamy, and equal right of dissolution of marriage."
LESLIE J. HARRIS ET AL., FAMILY LAW 230 (1996) (citing Legal Status of Married Women, U.N.
Commission on the Status of Women, at 1, U.N. Doc. ST/SOA/35 (1958)).
12. 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
13. See, e.g., Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1889).
14. See Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals
Rather Than States, 32 AM. U. L. REv. 1, 44 (1982).
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McDougal and his colleagues referred to victims of polygamy. 5 In
1946, Justice Murphy, to revert to the American story, had already
drawn attention to a world in which polygamy was simply one of the
forms of marriage.' 6
Clearly legal systems have different ideas about marriage. Thus,
consider a statute in Iraq:
4. Marriage to more than one woman shall not be permitted except
with the permission of a judge and for such permission to be
given the following two conditions must be fulfilled:
(a) The husband must have the financial ability to support more
than one wife.
(b) There must be some lawful benefit.
5. If a lack of equity between the wives is feared, polygamy shall
not be permitted; the assessment of this shall be left to the judge.
6. Any man who makes a marriage contract with more than one
woman in breach of the provisions of paragraphs 4 and 5 shall be
punished by a prison sentence which shall not exceed one year or
by a fine not exceeding one hundred dinars or both.17
A statute in Kuwait states that "[t]he husband shall not be enti-
tled to house a second wife with his first wife in a single dwelling with-
out her consent."' And there are yet other ideas about monogamy.
For example, a statute in Lebanon states that "[a] person who marries
three times shall not be permitted to marry a fourth time."' 9
This all gives force to the question by anthropologist Clifford
Geertz: "Is the fact that 'marriage' is universal (if it is) as penetrating
15. See Myres S. McDougal et al., Human Rights for Women and World Public Order: The
Outlawing of Sex-Based Discrimination, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 497, 506 (1975) (noting that polygamy
was especially a problem in situations (often tribal) in which marriages were not registered). This
idea, while true, does not exhaust the cases.
16. See Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 25-26 (1946) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
17. THm LAW OF PERSONAL STATUS, LAW No. 188, art. 3(3-6) (1959) (Iraq), reprinted in
DAWOUD SUDQI EL AL.A.ui & DOREEN HINCHCLIFFE, ISLAMIC MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE LAWS
OF THE ARAB WORLD 63, 66 (1996) (stating that the Koran limits the number of wives to four
and that Tunisia banned polygamy altogether using the idea of equality required by Islamic law,
based on the argument that this condition could never be met).
18. LAW No. 51 OF 1984 CONCERNING PERSONAL STATUS, art. 85 (Kuwait), reprinted in EL
ALAim & HINCHCLIFFE, supra note 17, at 130.
19. THm LAW OF THE RIGHTS OF THE FAMILY OF 16 JULY 1962, art. 31 (Leb.), reprinted in
EL ALAmI & HINCHCLIFFE, supra note 17, at 152 (applicable to Christians).
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a comment on what we are as the facts concerning Himalayan polyan-
dry, or those fantastic Australian marriage rules, or the elaborate
bride-price systems of Bantu Africa?
2 1
Similarly, there are many ideas about dissolution. One idea, of
course, is that marriage is permanent and that it cannot be dissolved
except by death.2 ' But this is only one idea. One can begin thinking
about this question from the point of view of natural law and the gen-
eral desirability of a certain amount of stability in human relations.
Professor John Finnis writes:
All human societies show a concern for the value of human life; in
all, self-preservation is generally accepted as a proper motive for
action, and in none is the killing of other human beings permitted
without some fairly definite justification. All human societies
regard the procreation of a new human life as in itself a good thing
unless there are special circumstances. No human society fails to
restrict sexual activity; in all societies there is some prohibition of
incest, some opposition to boundless promiscuity and to rape, some
favour for stability and permanence in sexual relations.
22
But even if we adopt a position in the universal value of stability
in marriage, as Professor Finnis suggests, we would have to answer the
question of how much stability and in what contexts. Thus, we have
John Locke's consideration of the issue. He begins with the familiar
argument that the dependency of children is the basis for the whole
idea of permanence:
And herein, I think, lies the chief, if not the only reason, why the
male and female in mankind are tied to a longer conjunction than
other creatures-viz., because the female is capable of conceiving,
and, de facto, is commonly with child again, and brings forth too a
new birth, long before the former is out of a dependency for support
on his parents' help and able to shift for himself, and has all the
assistance due to him from his parents ......
Then Locke moves to the further question:
But though these are ties upon mankind which make the conjugal
bonds more firm and lasting in a man than the other species of ani-
mals, yet it would give one reason to inquire why this compact,
where procreation and education are secured and inheritance taken
20. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 43 (1973),
21. If that. See JAMES A. BRUNDAGE, LAW, SEx, AND CHRISTIAN SOCIETY IN MEDIEVAL
EUROPE 68 (1987) (noting some early opposition to the second marriage of widows and
widowers).
22. JOHN FNis, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RoIGHTS 83 (1992).
23. JoHN LocKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 156 (1989).
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care for, may not be made determinable, either by consent, or at a
certain time, or upon certain conditions, as well as any other volun-
tary compacts, there being no necessity, in the nature of the thing,
nor to the ends of it, that it should always be for life-I mean, to
such as are under no restraint of any positive law which ordains all
such contracts to be perpetual.2
The justification for permanence in marriage solely because of the
requirements of the two individuals in the couple-as against the
requirements of children and particularly small children-is still
debated.25
All of this raises the question: What do writers mean by divorce?
This is as much an issue as the question: What do writers mean by
marriage?26 Clearly, both are culturally specific. For instance, in 1862
Mississippi:
[it was] lawful for any married woman to alledge [sic] as a cause of
divorce, that her husband is engaged in the service of the United
States of America, either in the army or navy, or from choice reside
in any one of the States of the United States in preference to resid-
ing in one of the Confederate States. Provided, that such divorce
shall not render illegitimate the children of such marriage 27
24. Id.
25. See, e.g., CARL E. SCHNEIDER & MARGARET F. BRINIG, AN INVITATION TO FAMILY
LAW: PRINCIPLES, PROCMSS AND PERSPECrIvEs 60 (1996) (discussing the Appleby hypothetical).
26. In a legal proceeding, the instrument would have to be interpreted. See, e.g., Richard S.
Kay, Original Intentions, Standard Meanings & the Legal Character of the Constitution, CONsT.
COMMENTARY 39, 41 n.9 (1989) (discussing the interpretation of a sign reading "No Football
Coaches Allowed." When the sign is read by an American, it is interpreted as a mysterious
discrimination. But the meaning is clarified when the reader learns that the sign is located in
Oxford, England. What would it mean as part of an international instrument?).
Along the same lines, what did the writer mean by "protect" as in Article 16 of the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights? Consider also the Irish Constitution of 1937: "1. The State
pledges itself to guard with special care the institution of Marriage, on which the Family is
founded, and to protect it against attack. 2. No law shall be enacted providing for the grant of a
dissolution of marriage." IR. CoNsT. (1937), art. 41 (The Family), reprinted in MICHAEL
OAKESHOTr, THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL DocriniEs OF CONTEMPORARY EUROPE 74 (1941).
Of course, the Irish situation has changed since 1937. See, e.g., Pope's Visit Didn't Stem Church's
Ebbing Tide, IRIsH TIMES, Oct. 2, 1999, at 10 (recalling the Papal visit of 1979 and reviewing
changes pertaining to contraception, divorce and abortion).
Another example of the idea of protection is the material filed by Monaco in 1936 in
response to an inquiry by the League of Nations: "In Monaco, women are not entitled to vote
nor are they eligible for membership of any public body. As regards to the protection of women,
prostitution is prohibited in Monaco and professional souteneurs [pimps] are punished under the
Criminal Code." MARGARET COLE, MARRIAGE PAST AND PRESENT 141 n.1 (1939).
27. 1862 Miss. Laws CCXII (emphasis in original). And consider a list of numerous spe-
cific grounds for divorce noted by E. Adamson Hoebel:
1. A bad omen of the bile sac of the sacrificial animal at any one of the four
feasts of the marriage ritual.
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In China, "[flor more than two thousand years disobedience to a hus-
band's parents, barrenness, adultery, jealousy, incurable disease,
loquacity, and theft were the traditional and lawful reasons for divorc-
ing a wife. ''28
And who can initiate the divorce? John Milton, whose works in
divorce are often cited loosely as calling for liberal divorce, more
accurately calls for liberal divorce at the request of the husband.2 9
Milton's discussion is conducted within a patriarchal religious frame-
work. Thus it has been noted that "Milton's ideal of marriage is cer-
tainly one of mutuality where the partners are responsive to and
delight in each other. Yet the framework of marriage remains relent-
lessly patriarchal. ' 30 In a discussion comparing Milton with the Old
2. A bad omen of the bile sac at any of the three principal rice feasts of either
family during the first year after the completion of the marriage rituals.
3. Barrenness.
4. Continuous dying of offspring.
5. Permanent sexual disability.
6. Unwillingness to perform the sexual act.
7. Neglect in time of sickness, "failure to cherish."
8. Insulting language by an in-law.
9. Reduction of the area of fields agreed on in the marriage contract.
10. Selling of a rice field for insufficient reason and without consent of the other
spouse.
11. Continued refusal of a father-in-law to deliver the fields called for in the mar-
riage contract when the couple reaches a reasonable age.
12. Incurring of unreasonable debts.
13. Chronic laziness or shiftless conduct.
14. Failure to perform certain special duties involved in getting married.
15. Any legal offense by a kinsman of one spouse against a kinsman of the other.
16. Insanity.
17. Extreme jealousy.
18. Incompatibility.
19. Dereliction of affection.
20. Desertion.
21. Adultery.
E. ADAMsoN HOEBEL, THE LAW OF PRIMITIVE MAN: A STUDY IN COMPARATIVE LEGAL
DYNAMIcs 111-12 (1954) (citing R.F. BARTON, IFUGAO LAW 30-31 (1919)).
28. T'UNG-Tsu CH'u, LAW AND SociETY IN TRADITIONAL CHINA 118 (1961). It is further
stated:
But at the same time there were three conditions under which a wife could not be
divorced: 1) if she had no close relative to receive her; 2) if she had worn three years'
mourning for her husband's parents; and 3) if the husband's family having been poor at
the time of the marriage had since become wealthy. When any of these three condi-
tions prevailed, none of the seven causes mentioned would justify divorce, except under
one or two special conditions, as specified in the law.
Id. The reference here to the extended family suggests the point that traditional legal systems
may be built on the idea not that the divorced wife is thrown out into the streets alone, but
rather that she will return, in whatever status, to the enclosures represented by her family of
origin.
29. See JOHN MILTON, The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce, in COMPLETE PROsE
WoRKs OF JOHN MILTON VOL. II, at 234, 306 (1959).
30. Sheila Briggs, Response to Rachel Adler's "The Battered Wife of God", 7 S. CAL, REV.
L. & WoMEN's STUD. 213, 218 (1998).
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Testament prophet Hosea, it is noted that "[f]irst, both infer that only
the male partner has the right to initiate a divorce. Second, divorce as
a solely male prerogative has the consequence that women have a
greater duty to be responsive to their spouse and foster mutuality in
marriage."31 The conclusion is that the "asymmetry of power which
constitutes all patriarchal forms of marriage persists even when the
discourse of mutuality is adopted."32
Domestic legal systems stand in different relations to the religious
discussion. In the United States, we are accustomed to a discussion
largely restricted to divorce in the Christian tradition. Indeed, the gen-
eral attack on the Western stance towards non-Western countries and
institutions was once associated with issues of proselytizing. For
example, in 1862, the King of Siam wrote the following to Anna Leo-
nowens, the English woman who would teach his children:
And we hope that in doing your education on us and on our chil-
dren (whom English call inhabitants of benighted land) you will do
your best endeavor for knowledge of English language, science, and
literature, and not for conversion to Christianity; as the followers of
Buddha are mostly aware of the powerfulness of truth and virtue, as
well as the followers of Christ, and are desirous to have facility of
English language and literature, more than new religions.33
Today, the attack on the West is formulated loosely in terms of
domination or hegemony, "Western" values as much as specifically
Christian values. Yet, the religious background should not be ignored.
It is possible to say that the Western approach to marriage and divorce
is divided between those countries which are religious and those
which are secular. Thus, Donna Sullivan writes about Ireland: "Nom-
inally secular law may embody religious doctrine in the guise of
majoritarian social policy."'34 It is certainly true that the association of
other countries with the Christianity of their past is much
attenuated.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. ANNA HAREmr LEONOWENS, THE ENGLISH GovERNEss AT THE SIAMESE COURT at
v-vi (1998). Leonowens commented in her account on the "ladies of his Excellency's private
Utah .... " Id. at 18.
34. Sullivan, supra note 7, at 836.
35. The United States provides a clear example. See generally Carol Weisbrod, Family,
Church and State, 26 J. FAm. L. 741 (1988) (discussing the diminishing intensity of Christian
identification over time).
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A review of that association may be useful, if only to remind us of
how close to that history we are. In the United States, in those states
following Christian approaches, state laws restricted divorce (though
it was becoming increasingly available), insisted on monogamy and
prohibited incestuous marriages.36 As to divorce, it was possible for
writer Ludwig Lewisohn to discuss a religious exemption (a reestab-
lishment of religious courts) to sustain the Jewish approach to divorce.
He saw an America in which all groups were forced to use a Christian
approach.7 The restrictions on birth control were assumed by the
State system following the Catholic position. Jewish law was more
open on the issue of contraception-as on divorce-though its availa-
bility in practice was restricted in part because of the rules of the sur-
rounding State systems. Other family law issues (relating, for
example, to religious matching in the context of adoption) had an
impact on both groups. As it has been written:
Problems under the law were different for the two immigrant
groups. For Catholics, the possibility of divorce in the secular cul-
ture raised the question of whether to divorce and remarry in the
outside system without the blessing of the church. (The church typi-
cally insisted that the first marriage, unless annulled by the church,
remained valid.) For Jews, the question might result in confusion on
the issue of which official-religious or secular-had authority to
issue a divorce, because both systems recognized divorce and
remarriage. Rabbinic authority in the country of origin was some-
times sufficient to effect such a change in legal status. In the United
States, it was not. The risk was that mistaken reliance on a religious
divorce would result in a bigamous second marriage.
3 8
The Krishnaswami report concluded that "because of the great
variety of policies followed by States in this matter-some recognizing
36. Maryland required a religious marriage ceremony until 1963. See Goldin v. Goldin, 426
A.2d 410, 413, 48 Md. App. 154, 157 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981) (noting that prior to Laws 1963,
ch. 406, "no valid marriage could be performed in this State without some sort of religious
ceremony").
37. See LUDwIG LEwIsoIN, MID-CHANNEL: AN AMERICAN CHRONICLE 29-30 (1929).
However, there might also be a religious contractual component. A history of marriage reveals
special legal wrinkles about various groups as to form. See also Trm DOuc IOnORs oF BRrnSH
COLUMBIA 190-95 (Harry B. Hawthorn ed., 1955) (discussing legal issues raised by Doukhobor
marriages and generally); John McLaren, The Doukhobor Belief in Individual Faith and Con-
science and the Demands of the Secular State, in RELIGIOUS CONSCIENCE, AND THE STATE AND
THE LAW: HISTORICAL CONTEXTS AND CONTEMPORARY SIGNIFICANCE 117 (John McLaren &
Harold Coward eds., 1999). Issues also exist as to substance. The Mormon Church in America
provides a familiar example of a substantive disagreement (polygamy).
38. Carol Weisbrod, Law, in JEWISH WOMEN IN AMERICA: AN HISTORICAL ENCYCLOPE.
DIA 802, 803 (PAULA HYMAN & DEBORAH DASH MOORE EDS., 1998).
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the dissolution of marriage by divorce and others not recognizing-it
is impossible to frame a rule covering all countries and legal sys-
tems."39 The most he felt he could say was that "[iln countries which
recognize the dissolution of marriage by divorce, the right to seek and
obtain a divorce should not be denied to anyone whose convictions
admit divorce on the ground that he professes a particular religion or
belief."40
III. PARTICULARIZING THROUGH CONTRACT
As a general point, contract is a useful device for particularizing
many kinds of arrangements. While the Western marriage contract is
often seen as an adhesion contract based on status ideas,41 it is useful
to see it as a contract and also to see what kinds of variations the law
of contract might facilitate. These issues can be seen clearly in the
case of the Islamic marriage contract.
In 1969, Sir Norman Anderson observed that Islamic Family Law
was "almost the only part of Islamic law which is still applied by courts
all over the world to the vast majority of Muslims .... 42 Some of this
is done because some countries continue to use religious legal systems
as personal law. It is also true in countries that do not incorporate
religious legal systems in that way because individuals choose to use
religious law. "Contract" may enter the story in two ways. Some tra-
ditions offer contractual solutions, at least for some problems. Thus,
some states which use Islamic Family Law have recognized the possi-
ble use of such contracts within Islamic law. In those states that do
not, contracts born in religious law may come into litigation through
general contract ideas.
39. Arcot Krishnaswami, Study of Discrimination in the Matter of Religious Rights and
Practices, U.N. Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities,
at 39, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/200/Rev.1 (1960).
40. Id. Do we assume that a privacy right gives a right to no-fault as the basic divorce
structure? Kirshnaswami thought it was impossible to frame a single rule, I assume, because he
was trying to derive one rule from divergent but acceptable practices. If we decide that the
divergent practices are not acceptable because they violate a standard (e.g., equality) the enter-
prise becomes possible. The Krishnaswami treatment is notable in its awareness of variation in
religious practices and beliefs.
41. See generally Carol Weisbrod, The Way We Live Now: A Discussion of Contracts and
Domestic Arrangements, 2 UTAH L. Rev. 777 (1994) (discussing arguments concerning contracts
and marriage).
42. Sir Norman Anderson, Islamic Family Law, in 4 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
COMPARATrVE LAW 105 (Mary Ann Glendon ed., 1969).
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That the Islamic marriage contract is conceptually contractual
(rather than having an emphasis on status or covenant) is clear in the
following description from a Pakistani judge: "The rights arising out
of an Islamic marriage contract are not the gifts of any legislative body
of a country; they emanate from the proposal and the acceptance of
the parties made at marriage time."43 The contract is understood as
simultaneously temporal and religious. The religious marriage con-
tract suggests that the current conversation on the "commercializa-
tion" of marriage through contract, a conversation common in the
United States, makes most sense against a particular background,
Western, which focuses on romantic love. Further, it suggests that the
idea that there is little room for variations in the marriage contract is
perhaps more culturally specific than we as Americans ordinarily see.
The 1958 United Nations report on the status of women began with a
discussion of variations, and then noted that this was not a possibility
in legal regimes derived from English common law.44
In any case, there is considerable interest among Islamic women
in the idea of using the contractual aspects of Islamic marriage to pro-
tect women's rights in order to stipulate, for example, that a woman
43. DAVID PEARL & WERNER MENSKI, MUSLIM FAMILY LAW 176 (3rd ed., 1998) (quoting
Pakistani writer and judge, Tanzil-ur-Rahman).
44. See Legal Status of Married Women, U.N. Commission on the Status of Women, at 47,
U.N. Doe. ST/SOA/35 (1958). According to the report:
The laws of many countries not only prescribe the "statutory regime" but also set
forth in detail, alternative "contractual regimes" (regimes conventionnels) which the
prospective spouses may adopt as a whole in a pre-nuptial agreement.
Although various alternative contractual regimes may be set out in the law, any
one of which may be adopted in toto merely by statement in the marriage contract,
most countries also permit marriage contracts with some variations from the system or
systems contained in the Codes, always, however, within limitations of "public policy"
(ordre public); as will be seen below there is considerable difference among countries
on what types of voluntary arrangements are prohibited.
Aliernative matrimonial regimes are not provided for under the laws of those
countries whose system stems from the English common law. In the United Kingdom,
Canada (except for Quebec), most states of the United States, New Zealand and Aus-
tralia, ante-nuptial agreements and marriage settlements may be made but they do not
change the matrimonial regime which is separation of property.
In practice, however, even when alternative regimes are available, most couples do
not enter into marriage contracts; they are often unaware of the different regimes avail-
able, and it may also be that prospective husbands and wives are not concerned imme-
diately before marriage about arrangements on property and finances. Consequently,
the regime which is applicable by law in the absence of a contract becomes, in fact the
regime prevailing in each country.
Id. at 48.
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may work without her husband's permission and may also divorce him
(using his right to divorce as delegated to her).a5
Of course, there are limits on what might be achieved through
contract in general. However, it seems reasonable to suggest that
approaches that start with the position that particular women do not
understand their rights under international law, and therefore must be
acted for, will tend to undercut the contractual capacity of those
women should they attempt to use contract solutions available with
traditional law as it exists in domestic legal systems. Thus, we have a
description of the efforts to draft a model Islamic marriage contract:
As for a specific example of where Islamic law is a mechanism for
empowerment of women, we have been working on: creating a
model Islamic marriage contract. In Islamic law, marriage is pri-
marily a contract, not a sacrament, and there are quite a lot of spe-
cific elements that can go into that contract. Both parties have the
opportunity to include all of their particulars in that relationship via
this contract. Yet, on many issues affecting marriage, there are dif-
ferences of opinion within Islamic jurisprudence, and you can
choose which particular opinion will apply to you in your marriage.
So, for example, people include clauses against polygamy, equaliz-
ing divorce rights of both parties, even regarding custody; all these
kinds of issues can be worked out in advance.4 6
Initially, however, there is a question of contractual intent. Are
these verbal acts ceremonial only or do the parties understand them as
contracts having substantively binding aspects under state law? This
issue becomes important as a background to this discussion because if
religious contracts are not really contracts, then they can not provide
any particular enforceable solutions to the problems of gender equal-
ity that are of concern.
As to the problem of variation by agreement, one question is his-
torical: Under what circumstances did religious legal systems (or legal
systems in general) accept the possibility of variation by agreement
and what kind of provisions were accepted?4 7
45. See Panel Discussion, Models of Successful "Religion and Lawyering" Programs, 26
Fo.Diiam U.B. L.J. 917 (1999).
46. Id. at 933 (quoting panelist Asifa Quraishi).
47. See Lucy Carroll, Talaq-I-Tafwid and Stipulations in Muslim Marriage Contract: Impor-
tant Means of Protecting the Position of the South Asian Muslim Wife, 16 MOD. AsIAN STUD. 277
(1982); see also PEARL & MENSKI, supra note 43, at 178 (discussing Lynn Welchman's research
on the West Bank); Nelly Henna, Marriage Among Merchant Families in Seventeenth-Century
Cairo, in WOMEN, THE FAmi'y AND DIVORCE LAWS iN IsLAMIC HISTORY 143, 147 (Amira El
Azhary Sonbol ed., 1996).
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Thus, one question is whether, at some moment, a religious legal
system is prepared to use the possibility of variation by agreement as a
way of solving a particular problem. One thinks of the discussions of
the problem of the get (Jewish divorce) and the possibility of solving
some part of that problem by a provision in the ketubah (Jewish mar-
riage contract), a solution to which some parts of the Jewish commu-
nity are more receptive than other parts. Here, too, one finds
discussion of ameliorating clauses in the Islamic marriage contract. If
included in the contract and if either complied with or enforced, then
at least in theory individual variations are, it seems, possible.
Nevertheless, contract as an idea raises its own problems. If some
clauses are good for women, then others might be not so desirable.
Such clauses might involve the waiver of rights rather than expansion
of rights."a
In secular contracts, the solution to a problem can be a compul-
sory term. But is this solution subject to the idea of religious, consci-
entious objection? That is, if we as the state mandated compulsory
divorce insurance for a certain amount, could Islamic couples-con-
sider the wife in the Shah Bano case when she was young-have
received a religious exemption? 49
Then there is the issue of custom. It has been noted:
While rights for Muslim women have been affirmed social customs
continue to dominate, still making them unavailable. Such customs
include arranged marriages in which the consent of the woman (and
sometimes of the man) involved is not sought; the appropriation of
Adrien Katherine Wing notes that such stipulations are rarely made among Palestinian
women, either because of a "reluctance to defy local custom or a lack of knowledge about this
option." Adrien Katherine Wing, Custom, Religion and Rights: The Future Legal Status of Pales-
tinian Women, 35 HARv. IN'L. L.J. 149, 162 (1994).
48. For example, a husband might insist on stipulations that enable him to maintain control
over his wife's employment. He might also refuse to accept stipulations proposed by the wife
concerning such factors as her education, her right to divorce on his taking a second wife or
other actions.
49. The Shah Bano case concerned a woman residing in India, who was divorced by her
husband after a forty-four year marriage. Her husband argued that he was not obliged to pro-
vide maintenance under the standards of the secular law, but was only bound by religious law.
The controversy in India over support/maintenance orders under Islamic law and Indian law
continued for some years. See P. Jaganmohan Reddy, Shah Bano Verdict and Muslim Law, in
THE SHAH BAr o CoRmovERsY 41, 41-45 (Asghar Ali Engineer ed., 1987); Vrinda Narain,
Women's Rights and the Accommodation of "Difference:" Muslim Women in India, 8 S, CAL.
REv. L. & WomEN's STUD. 43, 56-57 (1998); Anika Rahman, Note, Religious Rights Versus
Women's Rights in India: A Test Case for International Human Rights Law, 28 COLUM. J. TRANS.
NATL'L L. 473, 473-82 (1990).
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the dowry by the father as a compensation for the loss of his daugh-
ter, even though Islamic law guarantees it to the bride alone; the
lack of equal treatment of wives in polygamous marriages; and the
abuse of the privilege of divorce (especially in the Gulf region) in
which the husband simply states 'you are divorced' three times,
without recourse to arbitration or attempt at reconciliation.50
One question is whether these customs are part of the contract
even though they are not required by religious law. Another question
is whether they might somehow be negated, even if they are a part of
the contract in general. It seems that they might be assumed as terms
under modem American approaches to the interpretation of commer-
cial contracts, but they might also be negated by a strong statement of
intent. They might be more negated generally through a statute, at
which point one would not be focused on individual intent. But it
might also be difficult to get such a statute adopted, because the cus-
tom might more accurately reflect the community's interests.
Other difficult issues relate to the idea of enforcement. Clearly,
enforcement does not necessarily mean, for example, specific per-
formance and contractual options-following the Uniform Commer-
cial Code-but might also include agreed-upon remedies, as well as
statutory remedies.51 It is also clear that remedies are a cultural insti-
tution, and that in the American culture certain remedies are assumed
to be inappropriate. For instance, we do not hang people for violating
the sanctity of contract. Our sense of the appropriate remedy for
breach of contracts conventionally starts with money damages. When
our thinking moves to what the law of contracts considers the atypical
remedy (e.g., specific performance) we run into serious difficulty in
the domestic context.
To begin with, it is clear that in many family law cases, money is
not an adequate remedy and therefore other possibilities must be con-
sidered. Thus, the promise of the surrogate mother to give up the
child, promises to give a get and promises for the religious upbringing
of children all present instances in which money is not really the
desired remedy if the promise is broken. Yet, other more direct reme-
dies may be barred because, for example, personal services contracts
are not specifically enforceable and the United States Constitution
50. Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, Islam and Gender: Dilemmas in the Changing Arab World,
in IsLAM, GENDER & SOCIAL CHANGE 7 (Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad & John L. Esposito eds.,
1998).
51. For a general treatment, see Weisbrod, supra note 41 (drawn on in this discussion).
92 REVIEW OF LAW AND WOMEN'S STUDIES [Vol. 9:77
guarantees "the free exercise of religion, '5 2 with all the complexities
of that idea.
Whether these agreements in fact should be directly enforced will
depend (as it has always depended) on a policy judgment that is heav-
ily influenced by underlying social factors, including the behavior,
intentions and reliance of the individuals involved, and the judicial
reading of those factors.
Of course, any contract may still be "unconscionable" or
"unfair," and thus unenforceable.53 The problem for us is not so much
judicial power to police domestic contracts for fairness and the like as
our judicial standard, because it will vary greatly depending on the
kind of state and the kind of social issue they are considering. What
are the objectives of the state in these contexts? What is fair? How
do we know it? Where do we look for state policy on the question?
It has recently been emphasized that, even in the West, the idea
that multiple forms of religion can exist in a single state and be accept-
able is relatively new. Professor Thomas Franck makes this point by
comparing the language of Chancellor Kent in the blasphemy case
People v. Ruggles54 to something which an Islamic fundamentalist
might say today.55 Franck writes, "The Ayatollah Khomeinei could
not have said it better.
56
The issues of ceremonials and contracts being recognized at all is
a question for systems which link church and state fairly closely, either
by being structurally theocratic or by considering themselves more
loosely as operating within a religious tradition. The whole emphasis
on the rights of individuals may be secondary both to the larger state
and to the minority religion asking for recognition. The liberal, secu-
lar state stresses the rights of the individual as a foundational point.57
In the system of liberal thought, individuals are thought to have free
52. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
53. See U.C.C. § 2-302 (1998). Even aside from such a direct policing doctrine, results can
be achieved by manipulation of technical doctrines, although "[c]overt tools are never reliable
tools." Karl N. Llewellyn, Book Reviews, 52 HARv. L. REv. 700, 703 (1939) (reviewing 0.
PRAUSNrrz, THE STANDARDIZATION OF COMMERCIAL CONTRACTs IN ENGLISH AND CONrINEN-
TAL LAW (1937)).
54. 8 Johns. 290, 295 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811).
55. Thomas M. Franck, Is Personal Freedom a Western Value?, 91 Am. J. INT'L L. 593, 616
(1997).
56. Id.
57. 1975 was the international year of the women. In 1973, six countries denied suffrage to
women. McDougal et al., supra note 15, at 501 n.23 (listing Jordan, Kuwait, Liechtenstein, Nige-
ria, Saudi Arabia and Yemen).
1999] WOMEN AND RELIGIOUS MARRIAGE CONTRACTS 93
choice of religion, including the right to use religious courts58 or to
change religions.59
Domestic courts dealing with religious marriage contracts can
refuse to enforce them under a variety of theories. In the United
States, it might be said that judicial enforcement of such contracts
would violate the Establishment Clause.6" A Canadian court has
recently found, that the religious contract providing for a return of the
mahr (payment by the husband to the wife) was unenforceable in a
system without an Establishment Clause, because religious obliga-
tions, such as the Christian contractual obligation to love, are non-
judiciable in state courts.61 (The court used United States Supreme
Court material on "religious thickets" or entanglement).6' Or, a con-
tract may be unenforceable because at least one of the parties lack
contractual capacity.63  The questions become whether individual
choices are too damaging to the individuals themselves to be permit-
ted (even though free) and whether an individual's situation should be
58. Theodor Meron writes:
The norm of prohibition of discrimination against women would not be implicated
where women themselves select religious tribunals as the forum for adjudication, and
where women have full access to secular courts. But where religious tribunals assert
the power to adjudicate the legal rights of women or where national legislation embod-
ies religious law, the status of the rights guaranteed by the Discrimination Against
Women Convention may be implicated.
MERON, supra note 5, at 156-57.
59. While Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights protects the right to
change religion, later material is less clear on the issue. See Carolyn Evans, Religious Freedom in
European Human Rights Law, in RELIGION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 3, at 389.
60. Cf. Avitzur v. Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d 136 (N.Y. 1983) (upholding enforcement of ketuba);
Aziz v. Aziz, 488 N.Y.S.2d 123 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) (upholding enforcement of mahr (payment
given by the husband to the wife), which is distinct from the idea of the sale of the bride to the
husband).
61. Kaddoura v. Hammoud, No. 53247196, 1998 Ont. C. J. LExis 2504, at *1 (Ont. C. J.
Dec. 3, 1998). The husband and wife are described as "attractive, engaging and strong minded
young people" who identified with the religious community but were not orthodox. Id. at *3.
The wife sought both the deferred mahr and exemplary damages; both were denied. Id. at *3,
*5. There is no discussion of American cases involving similar contracts. Note also the descrip-
tion of the husband whom the judge regarded as somewhat "offensive and dishonorable", in
knowingly participating in traditional practices, including the promise of the $30,000 in the
deferred mahr, which he then refused to pay when these "customs and practices ... worked to
his financial detriment." Kaddoura v. Hammoud, No. 53247/96, 1999 Ont. C. J. Lmas 173, at *3
(Ont. C. J. Jan. 22, 1999).
62. Kaddoura, 1998 Ont. C. J. Las 2504, at *13.
63. A marriage contract between those who are under-age will raise this issue. And as for
those who are over-age? We see this as a capacity issue, or perhaps one involving undue influ-
ence or even duress. A rule in pre-revolutionary Russia said that those over the age of eighty
could not marry because they could not procreate. See HAROLD J. BERIMAN, JUsTICE IN THE
U.S.S.R.: AN INTERPRETATION OF Soviur LAw 332 (rev. ed., 1963). If fifteen is the recom-
mended age of marriage for the young, are we ready to set an age for the elderly?
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viewed as so "benighted"64 that the individual should not be permit-
ted to choose. There may be times when we say that the victim fails to
perceive the possibility that the situation can or should be remedied.
At this point, our analysis of the problem must take into account the
issue not only of ignorance65 or degradation, but also of disagreement
or lack of consensus on the desirability of the particular goal.
If one considers the question of human rights and marriage, one
of the points that initially suggests itself is that the precise trouble
spots, which might be identified as implicating human rights, have
varied over time. Thus, in seventeenth-century England, one issue
was whether Quakers and Jews could use their own contracts.6 6 The
"question could then be discussed not so much in terms of contracts,
but rather in terms of ceremonies. Where a particular religious cere-
mony is the norm, what does the system do with individuals adhering
to a minority religion? This remained an issue for some time. It was
still a significant point in the Krishnaswami report of 1960.67 Today,
there are issues about the availability of civil marriages in some coun-
tries, and questions of what status religious marriage contracts have
within a system of secular state-regulated marriage.6
The traditional legal approach to the marital status in the nine-
teenth century was enough like slavery to be uncomfortable. The
64. The word was used by the King of Siam. See LEoNOWENS, supra note 33, at 8.
65. See generally Paul Lewis, U.N. Adds Teeth to 20-Year-Old Treaty on Women's Rights,
N.Y. Tnus, March 21, 1999, at 6. The Tunes reported that the United Nations had to move in
the direction of creating stronger enforcement possibilities under the twenty-year-old Conven-
tion on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women. The new optional pro-
tocol allows a person suffering discrimination barred by the convention to appeal to an expert
committee following the exhaustion of remedies in her own country. Appeals can also be
brought to the committee by women's organizations or other groups acting on behalf of the
victim. The victim is required to give consent unless there is justification for going ahead without
that consent. The committee is also authorized to conduct its own investigation. The Tunes also
quotes Donna Sullivan: "Many persecuted women lack the education and the money to com-
plain themselves about human rights abuses." Id.
66. See BROMEY, supra note 8, at 37-38.
67. See Krishnaswami, supra note 39, at 37.
68. See LEo PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, & FREEDOM 577 (1953) (noting that marriage in
most civilized countries is a civil contract, though it might involve a variety of religious function-
aries). Krishnaswami, for all the differentiation he offers on this issue, did not see one that
would arise under an approach which insists on the strict separation of church and state. See
Krishnaswami, supra note 39, at 36-37. In the United States, for example, there might be a
question of constitutionality. For Leo Pfeffer, the question is how the delegation to religious
authorities represented by the clergyman officiating at the ceremony could square with the strict
separation of church and state. See PFEFFR, supra note 68, at 577. Pfeffer concludes that what
made the marriage is the intent represented by participating in the ceremony, rather than the
ceremony itself. See id. at 577-78.
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emphasis on equality in the 1979 convention makes plain that equality
was dramatically lacking in many places at this time. If monogamy is
not the "marriage" in question, inequality is clear in the facts that only
men have multiple partners and that polygamy as practiced may be
very close to slavery.69 As to the entry into the status, free consent to
marriage means both free choice of the status and of the individual.
Issues of the proper minimum age for marriage-both largely in the
present world issues involving women, though they also can and do
involve men7 -- are essentially about contractual capacity.
Probably the rules and institutions themselves must be under-
stood in a cultural context. An approach to maintenance, which
assumes that a divorced woman will be supported by her relatives, will
not look the same in a traditional world of extended family structures
and in a modern world in which relatives communicate with each
other by electronic mail across oceans and continents.71 As another
example, one may note that polygamy looks different in Africa and in
Paris.72 It may be, as Clifford Geertz suggests, that the assumption
that one rule will cover all cases is not universalist but provincial.73
Perhaps for us, as much as it was for earlier generations, marriage
is a problem as well as a solution. We can therefore sympathize with
Ralph Waldo Emerson's comment, perhaps derived from an earlier
69. Polygamy is an example of voluntary slavery in some philosophical discussions. See
Joel Feinberg, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Privacy, 58 NoTRE DAvm L. REv. 445, 474 (1983)
(discussing J. S. Mill's views on polygamy). Today, we would stress questions of post-divorce
property rights (an issue in the Western world and in India). See Joan Williams, Do Wives Own
Half? Winning for Wives After Wendt, 32 CoNN. L. REv. 249 (1999).
That some ideas of marriage are like slavery is commonplace. For instance, the notion is
evident in the folk song tradition, as seen in the lyrics of Wagoner's Lad:
Oh, hard is the fortune of all womankind,
She's always controlled, She's always confined,
Controlled by her parents until she's a wife,
A slave to her husband the rest of her life.
Wagoner's Lad, in THE JoAN BAz SONGBooK 20-21 (Maynard Solomon ed., 1964).
70. Child marriage sometimes involves under-age males. Margaret Cole notes a Chinese
tradition under which diseased children were married rather than having them die celibate. See
COLE, supra note 26, at 48 (citing J.H. GRAY, CHINA (1878)).
71. See Shoba Narayan, A Far Flung Clan Gathers on Line to Put Aunt Sheila to Rest, N.Y.
TimEs, Aug. 19, 1999, at G7 (describing a Hindu family from all over India and their world
meeting on-line).
72. For a discussion of polygamy in the United States, see Irwin Altman, Polygamous Fam-
ily Life: The Case of Contemporary Mormon Fundamentalists, 2 UTAH L. Rav. 367 (1996). On
polygamy among African immigrants living in the suburbs of Paris, see Marlise Simons, African
Women in France Battling Polygamy, N.Y. Tmms, Jan. 26, 1996, at Al, A6.
73. See Clifford Geertz, Anti Anti-Relativism, 86 AM. ANTHROPOLOGICA. ASS'N 263, 265
(1984).
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source, that marriage is an open question as is clear from how those
who are on the outside, want to get in whereas those inside want to
get out.74 The question becomes particularly complicated when we
admit cultural variations into our ideas of marriage.
IV. CONCLUSION
Part I of this Article raises the question as to what international
instruments mean by marriage and divorce, and presents a range of
possible meanings that are available once one steps out of particular
cultural settings. Part I of this Article reviews issues of contract law,
which might arise within a specific cultural setting, dealing with issues
of contracts and contractual variation of a particular form of marriage.
The relation between the two Parts might be seen in the idea of
expressive functions.75 Even if the international documents are not
precise on the questions raised, they do communicate something
about an expectation. If one is not perfectly clear about what "equal-
ity" between husband and wife might mean, then there is at least the
idea that women should not be degraded and abused in marriage. The
idea which is communicated is influential not merely through the par-
ticular enforcement devices of United Nations instruments, but also in
the expectations of individuals living within particular systems, who
then bring those expectations to their systems, as is suggested in the
discussion of the Islamic contract.
Discussing the idea of a uniform marriage law for the United
States in 1919, Fred Hall and Elisabeth Brooke urged caution about
imposing uniformity. They referred to the obligatory religious cere-
mony in Maryland, the marriage age and ethnological differences
between the Mexican girls of Texas, the urban Italians and the natives
of New England.76 And they quoted Justice Charles Evans Hughes
who stated that there has to be a "statesmanlike appreciation of past,
present and future" in pushing legislation.77 This was particularly
true, Hall and Brooke stated, as to "reforms that touch social institu-
tions older than recorded history itself."78 While "[c]ertain recognized
74. See Ralph Waldo Emerson, Montaigne; or, The Skeptic, in SELCrMD EssAys, LEc-
TuREs, AND POEMS 281, 285 (Robert D. Richardson ed., 1990).
75. Other cultural forms also express values. We might recall that Baywatch is presently
one of the most popular television programs in the world.
76. See HALL & BROOKE, supra note 8, at 10.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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essentials" were of course to be uniform, experimentation, they said,
ought to be possible.79
We are roughly, at this point in the international context, at the
end of the twentieth century. We know that international documents,
for example, Article 16 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, refer to consent to marriage. We know that the European
Court of Human Rights has said that there is no right to divorce under
the European human rights documents, although there is protection
for the family rights of a non-marital family created in the absence of
divorce.8" The problem at the moment is to answer the question:
What other essentials do we know?
Perhaps, the last word on the idea of essentials should go to
Arcot Krishnaswami: "As a general rule, it may be said that no one
should be prevented from having marriage rites performed in accord-
ance with the prescriptions of his religion or belief, nor be compelled
to undergo a religious marriage ceremony not in conformity with his
convictions.""'
79. Id. at 11.
80. See Johnston v. Ireland, 112 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 24-26 (1986).
81. Krishnaswami, supra note 39, at 38.

ARTICLES

